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QUESTION FOR REVIEW
Does the petitioner set forth any basis whereby certiorari could be considered?
The underlying decision of the Utah Supreme Court is
not ambiguous or confusing.

This Court should not reconsider

its earlier decision in the underlying action.

The Court of

Appeals correctly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel
in its ruling.

REFERENCE TO COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
The Court of Appeals decision in this matter is reported at 758 P.2d 451, 86 UAR 29.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered on
July 8, 1988.
1988.

A Petition for Rehearing was filed on July 21.

That petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on

August 3, 1988.
Jurisdiction of this Court is conferred by Utah Code
Annotated. §78-2-2(5) (amended 1986). and Rule 42. Rules of
the Utah Supreme Court.

CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
Not applicable

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Trimble.

as

real

estate

broker,

brought

a

suit

against Fitzgerald under the terms of an Earnest Money Agreement and Offer to Purchase whereby Fitzgerald was to buy property belonging to Monte Vista Ranch. Inc.

The Earnest Money

Agreement provided that the buyer would be responsible for any
real estate commissions.

The case was tried to a jury and

then appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which affirmed the
trial court's decision.

Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzger-

ald. 626 P.2d 453 (Utah 1981).
Trimble then sued Monte Vista Ranch. Inc., for the
commission claimed to be owing from the same transaction.

The

claim in the second lawsuit was for an alleged oral listing
agreement wherein Monte Vista Ranch, Inc.. allegedly agreed to
pay Trimble a commission on the sale of its property.

On a

Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court entered judgment
dismissing the claim against Monte Vista Ranch. Inc.. on the
grounds of collteral estoppel.

The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Trimble v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc.. 758 P.2d 451. 86 UAR 29.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
Petitioner Does Not Have a Basis for Consideration of Certiorari.
While it is recognized that Rule 43 of the Rules of
the Utah Supreme Court is not exclusive, and that the Court
may entertain any petition for certiorari, the Court has indicated that a petition will only be granted where there are
special and important reasons for granting a writ of certiorari.
The petitioner in this matter has not set forth any
claim under Rule 43(1) that there is any conflict between the
panels of the Court of Appeals, or under Rule 43(2) that the
Court of Appeals has decided any question of state or federal
law in conflict with any decision of this Court.

He has not

asserted under Rule 43(3) that the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision departing from the accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings.

He has not alleged under Rule 43(4)

that the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
municipal, state or federal law which has not been settled by
this Court.
The petitioner asks this Court to reconsider its own
former decision and to second guess the interpretation of that
decision by the Court of Appeals in rendering the decision
from which the Petitioner

for Writ of Certiorari has been

-3-

filed.

There are no questions of special or important matters

for the consideration of this petition.
POINT II
The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals Were Not
Misled by Any Confusing Language in the Utah Supreme
Court's Prior Opinion.
The first case of this matter was Mel Trimble Real
Estate v. Fitzgerald. 626 P.2d 453 (Utah 1981).

That case was

an action by Mel Trimble Real Estate against the buyer. Fitzgerald, for a claimed real estate commission on the sale of
the Monte Vista Ranch.
The second

case. Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte

Vista Ranch. Inc.. et al.. 758 P.2d 451 (Utah App. 1988). was
an action by Mel Trimble Real Estate against the seller. Monte
Vista Ranch. Inc.. for the same commission that was denied in
the first action.
Petitioner alleges that the parties and the issues
are different, and that thus there can be no collateral estoppel.

The

distinction

between

res

judicata

and

collateral

estoppel is that while the parties in collateral estoppel need
not be identical, the issues must be the same.

As the Court

of Appeals pointed out on July 8. 1988. collateral estoppel is
basically issue preclusion.
In the case against Fitzgerald, one of the principal
issues was framed in Jury Instruction No. 8. beginning:

The Court has ruled as a matter of law that
the agreement of December 7, 1977, imposed
upon defendant [Fitzgerald] the liability for
the real estate commission/ if any, owed
plaintiffs upon this transaction.
(emphasis
added)
This Court approved

that

instruction and the ruling

by the trial judge that any commission which might be owed was
owed

by defendant/buyer.

Leland

Fitzgerald.

The

jury found

that no commission was owed.
The trial court
Vista

Ranch.

essentially
whether

a

in the second action, against Monte

Inc., ruled

that

the

issue

in that

trial was

the same as the issue in the first trial, i.e..
real

estate

commission

was

due

from

the

sale of

Monte Vista Ranch, and if so. who should pay the commission.
The Court of Appeals found that to be the case when they said:
It is surely appropriate to conclude the
trial court would not have ruled that if any
commission were owed it was owed by Fitzgerald, unless that question had been presented
and litigated.
(Trimble v. Monte Vista
454).

Ranch.

Inc.. supra, at page

Instruction No. 8 given in the first trial specifically

held,

as

cited

above,

that

the court

had

ruled

as a

matter of law that the agreement imposed a duty upon defendant
Fitzgerald

for

the

liability,

if

commission.

Thus, the conclusion

this matter

is in perfect

any,

for

the

real

of the appellate

harmony with

Utah Supreme Court in the first appeal.

estate

court

the decision

in

of the

The first paragraph and the last paragraph of Point I
of petitioner's brief suggest that because the parties in the
first case were Trimble against Fitzgerald, and in the second
case were Trimble against Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., there can
be no collateral estoppel.
understand

Obviously, the appellant does not

the distinctions

between

the two branches

of res

judicata, and particularly the branch applicable in collateral
estoppel

or

trial court

issue preclusion..
in granting

The conclusions

summary

drawn

by the

judgment, and the conclusion

drawn by the Court of Appeals, are in complete

harmony with

the earlier decision of this Court.
POINT III
Certiorari Should Not Be Granted So That This
Court Can Reconsider Its Prior Decision.
Petitioner claims that the first decision was drafted
"by a very elderly retired
"obscure".

judge" and that the decision was

This writer's experience with Judge Maurice Hard-

ing is that he was at all times alert, very' bright, and very
perceptive of issues in cases.
The

suggestion

that

the

Supreme

Court

should

now

reconsider its allegedly ambiguous decision ignores the entire
principle

of res

judicata

and putting matters to rest.

decision was handed down on February 13, 1981;

The

if petitioner

believed the ruling to be ambiguous, a petition for rehearing
should have been filed under former Rule 76 of the Utah Rules
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of Civil Procedure.

To suggest that the Court should now

reconsider its 1981 decision is nothing short of ludicrous.
This writer does not believe that the 1981 opinion,
in which Justices Hall.

Stewart. Crockett

concurred,

or

is ambiguous

necessitates

and Henriod all

any clarification.

The matter should be brought to rest.
POINT IV
The Court of Appeals Did Not Fail to Review
Its Own Record Before Ruling on the Issue of
Collateral Estoppel.
Although petitioner claims Monte Vista Ranch. Inc..
was not a party to the earlier action, petitioner conceeds in
footnote 4 of his petition (page 5) that Monte Vista Ranch.
Inc.. was a party in the first proceeding in a crossclaira
brought by Fitzgerald against Monte Vista Ranch. Inc.
A careful reading of Judge Ormefs decision shows that
he did consider all of the information in the record submitted
to him by the appellant.

He considered both res judicata and

collateral estoppel and described the elements necessary (page
454). and that he specifically discussed whether all of those
conditions of collateral estoppel were met.

He discussed in

detail the Supreme Court decision, and in footnote 1 (page
454). he says:
Trimble's decision
its shareholders
against Fitzgerald
knew that, aside

not to join Monte Vista or
in the action commenced
tends to suggest Trimble
from whatever commissions

other parties might owe, no commission
owed by Monte Vista or its shareholders.

was

One cannot doubt that the Court of Appeals well understood that in the trial of the first matter, although Monte
Vista Ranch. Inc., was not a party, the doctrine of collateral
estoppel applied because the issue of commission was litigated
and decided adverse to the plaintiff.
The Court further discussed at some length the issue
of judicial notice as to matters outside the record, and concluded that it would not take judicial notice of matters not
presented

to the trial court.

The opinion well

demonstrates

the full consideration of this second appeal by the plaintiff,
and the application and implementation of collateral estoppel
as a bar to the plaintiff's claim.
The suggestion

that

the Court

of Appeals

failed

to

review its own record is not borne out by the detailed opinion
rendered in the matter.
CONCLUSION
This Court should deny the petition for certiorari.
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of October, 1988.
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